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Consider this press release from the future:  
 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of the Press Secretary 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE          November 22, 2014 
WASHINGTON —   Today, President Mercedes Chávez announced that 
Americans will now be required to spend one day a week without 
electrical power.  Details of the implementation of the new “conservation 
blackouts” will be released tomorrow.  Conservation blackouts will be 
imposed across the United Sates, roughly corresponding to the geographic 
outlines of our time zones.  Hawaii will be included in the Mountain Time 
Zone; Alaska will be blacked out during the same times as the Eastern 
Time Zone.  
This latest step toward a greener America has become necessary because 
last evening the Board of Directors of Exxon Corporation unanimously 
voted to divert all hydrocarbons it produces outside the United States to 
the still booming Chinese market. After the board meeting, the Exxon 
directors, who for the past two years have been nominated and elected by 
the three sovereign wealth funds that together own 75.5% of Exxon’s 
outstanding voting stock, telephoned the President informing her, “as a 
courtesy,” that they “had reluctantly and with regret” determined that this 
decision was in the best interests of Exxon and its shareholders.  They 
stated that the expanding Chinese economy, which has grown at more than 
9% in each of the past fourteen years,  would obviously be able to make 
substantially more productive use of Exxon’s crude oil and natural gas 
than the U.S. economy, mired as it has been, in the Great Recession which 
dates from 2007. 
As we know, in 2010 and 2011, the escalation of fuel prices added trillions 
of additional dollars to the sovereign wealth funds of a number of foreign 
nations.  Beginning in late 2011, in strict compliance with the Federal 
Emergency Public Company Relief Act of 2011 (“EPCRA 2011”), 
controlling interests in many of America’s largest corporations were 
purchased by the sovereign wealth funds of Singapore, China, and four of  
the United Arab Emirates.  Their two-year buying spree in 2011 and 2012 
resulted in what President Chávez referred to in her election campaign as 
the “extra-nationalization”1 of most major U.S. corporations.  To 
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“recycle” their huge dollar surpluses these sovereign wealth funds 
purchased controlling interests in eighty-eight of the corporations 
constituting the “Fortune 100.”  Once control of these companies had 
been transferred offshore, the primary focus of each of these corporations 
became support for the expanding consumer markets of Asia and Latin 
America.  This redirection of corporate purposes was in accord with 
Restated Santiago Principle 25, adopted by the sovereign wealth funds 
making up the International Working Group (“IWG”) Principle 25 of the 
IWG’s Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP”) had been 
announced by the IWG in August, 2011.  GAPP 25 conditions the rescue of 
America’s struggling corporate giants by these sovereign wealth funds on 
prior agreement by the U.S. Congress and the Administration’s Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) to the realignment 
of the primary business focus of the rescued companies to the vibrant, 
expanding economies of China and Latin America.  The reorientation of 
the business purposes of the rescued companies required by GAPP 25 was 
explicitly mandated in EPCRA 2011.   
****** 
“In a separate announcement  today, President Chávez also lauded the 
performance of America’s new Smartmatique voting machines in the 
recent mid-term election which gave her the support of an unprecedented 
68.7% of the House of Representatives and 70% of the Senate.  The 
President also thanked her husband, Venezuela’s Great Leader and 
President for Life, Hugo Chávez, for sending 1900 Venezuelan technicians 
on very short notice to clear up what at first had appeared to be a major 
technical flaw in the nation’s electronic voting machines.”2 
I.   THE THREAT FROM SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
The foregoing scenario is ridiculous, is it not?3  Given the current state of 
hysteria, hyperbole, and utter nonsense in current American political 
discourse, there may be those who assert that this is the fate we face from 
the threat of sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”). 
Some believe SWFs have already begun to take over the world.  A 
headline in the Christian Science Monitor asks, Will Sovereign Wealth 
Funds Rule the World?4  The New York Times picked up this theme in an 
editorial headlined, Who Will Come to the Rescue?5  In the popular press, 
  
 1. This term was first used in 2009 by Douglas Koenig, a law student in my 
Strategic International Transactions Seminar, to describe companies headquartered in one 
country but under constructive control of a different sovereign. 
 2. See infra note 126. 
 3. Please note, the above scenario is entirely hypothetical. 
 4. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, at 16. 
 5. Editorial, Who Will Come to the Rescue?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A22.  
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Robert Samuelson, a respected columnist for Newsweek magazine, refers to 
China’s predatory trade practices, feeding the fear that China’s investment 
practices may also be predatory.6  The International Herald Tribune 
described concern in the European Union in an article entitled, Europe 
Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary of Intentions of China 
and Russia.7  
Candidates for political office have also chimed in.  In a debate during 
her campaign to become the Democratic Party’s nominee for President in 
2008, Senator Hillary Clinton declared, “[w]e need to have a lot more 
control over what [sovereign wealth funds] do and how they do it.”8 
Professors Milhaupt and Gilson, stars of the corporate governance 
academy, have characterized the issue as one of “state capitalism as 
opposed to market capitalism”9 and proposed that shares of U.S.  companies 
in the hands of foreign states should lose their votes while so held.  
Even Hollywood has picked up this theme.  A recent James Bond 
adventure takes on the global struggle for oil in “The World Is Not 
Enough.”10  Perhaps the world is not enough, but Bond’s title song reveals 
that it is a “perfect place to start.”11  
This Article presents the background of the current SWF phenomenon 
and considers the supposed threat posed when SWFs either acquire outright 
ownership of U.S. companies or accumulate significant equity ownership 
stakes.12   
Part II of this Article reviews the evolution and development of SWFs 
from their first appearance in the mid-twentieth century to the economic 
crisis of 2007–2009.  SWFs have been established by more than fifty 
nations and subdivisions thereof with excess dollars and other foreign 
currencies generated either by sales of oil and natural gas and other 
commodities or by well-managed13 balance of trade regimes.  In particular, 
Part II analyzes (i) the explosive growth of assets under management by 
SWFs since 2004; (ii) their recent rise to prominence in public political 
debate; and (iii) the outsized investments in major financial institutions that 
  
 6. Robert J. Samuelson, The China Conundrum: Using Tires to Send a Message, 
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/215729. 
 7. Carter Dougherty, Europe Looks to Control State-Run Investors: Officials Wary 
of Intentions of China and Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 14, 2007, § News, at 1. 
 8. The Democratic Debate in Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/us/politics/15demdebate-
transcript.html?scp=1&sq=Democratic%20Debate%20in%20Las%20Vegas&st=cse. 
 9. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346, 
1362–65 (2008).  
 10. THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MGM Studios 1999).  
 11. GARBAGE, THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MCA 1999).  
 12. See infra, part II.A, for a discussion of various definitions of this term.  
 13. The descriptor “well managed” is required because there are economies where 
more than every available dollar is spent.  The United States is only one such example. 
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were once referred to as the “commanding heights”14 of the economy, as an 
important example of the role SWFs will have in the future. 
Part III of this Article briefly summarizes America’s long history of 
regulation of investments by foreigners.  Beginning with protections 
originating in the early nineteenth century, Part III highlights the efforts to 
regulate foreign investment, including the Congressional response to the 
threat posed by SWFs, manifested in the July 2007 enactment of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”).15  Part III further outlines 
the impact of FINSA on the administration of governmental reviews of 
foreign investments by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (“CFIUS”),16 an entity within the Executive Branch. 
Part IV of this Article considers recent actions taken by the leading 
SWFs through the IWG to address concerns raised by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), whose member 
countries have enjoyed large SWF investments.  The IWG published its 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (“GAPP”) in October, 2008.  
The GAPP starkly demonstrates my principal assertion: SWFs will not, and 
cannot be expected to, make commitments that will satisfy those who fear 
the consequences of investments by such funds.  The suggestion that 
principles or practices, such as those included in GAPP, could be 
implemented in a way that would alleviate such fears is at best self-
deluding.  At worst it is a cynical political ploy.  Indeed, such commitments 
are impossible for any category of investor.  To pretend that SWFs, created 
by and ultimately responsible to sovereign nations, will make meaningful, 
binding commitments not to act in their own best interests, is absurd on its 
face.  What has been suggested as “protection” for investee states would not 
be agreed to by private investors and is a complete non-starter for SWFs.   
Part V of this Article details the behavior of a few of the very largest 
SWFs since the extent of the current economic crisis became apparent.17  It 
  
 14.  
The term goes back three quarters of a century. . . . Lenin had 
initiated the New Economic Policy, permitting a resumption of small 
trade and private agriculture.  Now, communist militants were 
attacking him for compromising with capitalism and selling out the 
revolution. . . . Lenin defended the program.  Although the policy 
allowed markets to function, he declared, the state would control the 
“commanding heights,” the most important elements of the economy. 
See DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE 
WORLD ECONOMY xii (2002). 
 15. See generally U.S. Treasury, Office International Affairs, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).  See infra, 
note 127. 
 16. See infra, note 115. 
 17. Charles Roxburgh, et al., Global Capital Markets: Entering a New Era, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., Sept. 2009, at 10 (stating that every equity market in the 112 
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is instructive to consider how SWFs have acted because many of the tens of 
billions of dollars they invested in the world’s leading financial institutions 
in 2007 and 2008 vanished in 2008 with the demise of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, AIG, and others.  How the SWFs behaved once the 
enormity of the financial black hole that the crisis spawned became apparent 
is an indicator of the threat they pose. 
Part VI of this Article concludes with an appraisal of the behavior of 
SWFs in the crisis and what is to be learned concerning the threat SWFs 
pose.  
II.   THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
A.   What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund? 
The key characteristic of a SWF is its ownership and control by a 
sovereign government.18  There are a wide variety of definitions of a SWF. 
The U.S. Treasury Department defines SWFs as “a government investment 
vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages 
those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary 
authorities.”19 Deutsche Bank, a leading financial institution that follows 
SWFs exhaustively, defines SWFs as “government-owned investment funds 
which are commonly funded by the transfer of foreign exchange assets, and 
which are set up to serve [their] objectives . . . by investing the funds on a 
long-term basis, often overseas.”20  The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
(“SWF Institute”) describes a SWF as “a state-owned investment fund 
composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other 
financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets.”21   
  
nations it studies fell in 2008.  Global equity losses totaled $28 trillion or 50% of the 
aggregate). 
 18. “Sovereign” when used herein includes individual states of the United States, 
such as Alaska, and individual emirates within the United Arab Emirates, such as Abu 
Dhabi. 
 19. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES: APPENDIX SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 1 (June 2007), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-rates/pdf/2007_ 
Appendix-3.pdf. 
 20. Steven Kern, SWFs and Foreign Investment Policies: An Update, DEUTSCHE 
BANK RES. Oct. 22, 2008, at 2. 
 21. See, e.g., Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter SWF Institute]; 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php [hereinafter SWF Rankings].  
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The Monitor Company Group Ltd (“Monitor”) - Fondazione Eni Enrico 
Mattei (“FEEM”), a joint research project that focuses on SWFs, defines 
SWFs narrowly so as to only include seventeen in their list of SWFs.22  
A Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) study entitled “Report on 
Foreign Investments” defines SWFs based upon their “outside” focus and 
provides a four-element test for government policymakers.23  
There are at least fifty-two funds that fall within the SWF Institute’s 
broad definition.24  The smallest SWFs hold less half a billion dollars.25  
Each of the ten largest SWFs has assets exceeding $500 billion.26 
  
 22. Monitor and FEEM define a SWF on the basis of the essential characteristics that 
differentiate them from other government-owned investment vehicles. Specifically, a SWF 
must meet the following five criteria: 
1. It is owned directly by a sovereign government; 
2. It is managed independently of other state financial institutions; 
3. It does not have predominant explicit pension obligations; 
4. It invests in a diverse set of financial asset classes in pursuit of commercial 
returns; and 
5. It has made a significant proportion of its publicly-reported investments 
internationally. 
 See generally MONITOR GROUP, Q1 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at 
http://www.monitor.com/Portals/0/MonitorContent/documents/Monitor_SWF_Q1_2009_Re
port.pdf.  
 23.  
[The GAO] classified SWFs with the most interest to policymakers 
as those that (1) are government-chartered or sponsored investment 
vehicles; (2) invest some or all of their funds in assets other than 
sovereign debt outside the country that established them; (3) are 
funded through government transfers arising primarily from 
sovereign budget surpluses, trade surpluses, central bank currency 
reserves, or revenues from the commodity wealth of a country; and 
(4) are not actively functioning as a pension fund (money received 
from individuals). 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO], SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LAWS LIMITING 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AFFECT CERTAIN U.S. ASSETS AND AGENCIES HAVE VARIOUS 
ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES, GAO-09-608, at 5 (2009). 
 24. See infra App. A. 
 25. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 (noting Kiribati, Mauritania, and Indonesia 
rankings). 
 26. The ten largest SWFs are Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority (“SAMA”), Norway’s Government Pension Fund —Global, China’s 
State Agency for Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”), China Investment Corporation, Government 
of Singapore Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority, Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Investment Portfolio, Russia’s National Welfare Fund, and Singapore’s Temasek 
Holdings.  SWF Rankings, supra note 21.  The extreme size range of SWF assets becomes 
clear when we compare the $550 million Kiribati fund with the Abu Dhabi fund, which is 
more than1000 times larger.  Id.  
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B.   When Did Sovereign Wealth Funds Appear? 
The first of what we now label SWFs appeared in 1953.  The first SWFs 
were referred to by terms descriptive of their purpose or origin,27 such as 
“revenue equalization reserve funds,”28 “stabilization funds,”29 or simply 
“investment funds.”30  This Article uses the accepted term, “sovereign 
wealth fund,” coined in 2005 by Andrew Rozanov at State Street Global 
Markets.31   
Only fourteen SWFs existed prior to 1990.32  The first three SWFs were 
established prior to 1967.33  Following those, five were established during 
the 1970s; six were established in the 1980s; eight were established in the 
1990s; ten were established during the five years beginning with 2000 and 
ending in 2004; and nineteen were established after 2004.34  However, the 
date the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority began to act as a SWF is 
unknown.35  
Thirty of these SWFs are funded with proceeds from the export of crude 
oil or natural gas.36  Given the great commodity and consumer debt bubbles 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century, bubbles that took the price of 
crude oil from below $20 per barrel in the late 1990s to above $140 in 
2007,37 it is not a surprise that many SWFs are funded through the sale of 
crude oil and other commodities.  The commodity and debt bubbles also 
help explain why nineteen SWFs have been established since 2004.  Ten of 
the SWFs established in the twenty-first century are funded, not by 
  
 27. “The Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, a trust fund financed by phosphate 
earnings over the years, is still an important part of the government’s assets and contained 
more than [ ] $554 million in 2006. Kiribati has prudently managed the reserve fund, which 
is vital for the long-term welfare of the country.”  U.S. Department of State, Background 
Note: Kiribati, (May 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1836.htm. 
 28. “The Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, [was] established in 1956 to 
invest the profits from a tax on bird-manure fertilizer exports . . . .”  Kevin Hassett, 
Sovereign Funds Offer U.S. Big Gains, Small Risk, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 24, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=au8DAW5jHEks&refer=home. 
 29. For example, in 1953, the Kuwait Investment Board began and now maintains 
the Kuwaiti Future Generation Fund, and the Iran Oil Stabilisation fund was established in 
1999.  See SWF Institute, supra note 21. 
 30. Lee Hudson Teslik, Backgrounder on Sovereign Wealth Funds, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., Jan. 28, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15251/ (“SWFs can invest in 
whatever they want, just as if they were independent investment funds.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Andrew Rozanov, Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?, ST. STREET 
GLOBAL ADVISORS, Aug. 2005, at 1. 
 32. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 33. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 34. SWF Rankings, supra note 21; see infra App. A. 
 35. SWF Rankings, supra note 21 (“The . . . Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(“SAMA”), was established as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1952 to 
handle growing foreign reserve funds.”). 
 36. Id.  
 37. See infra Chart 3. 
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commodity exports, but by balance of trade surpluses,38 derived in part from 
the excessive debt that the United States and other consumers incurred and 
spent in this period. 
C.   Why Were Sovereign Wealth Funds Established? 
Each SWF has unique objectives.  Since we are dealing with entities 
controlled by sovereign governments, their investment philosophies and 
goals need not be disclosed.  They  may also be changed or ignored at any 
time. Nevertheless, SWFs often publish investment goals, and there are 
likely purposes or goals which are common to SWFs.  These goals include 
investing to: 
• Diversify away from non-renewable commodities; 39 
• Increase the return on national savings;40 
• Directly implement domestic economic development objectives; 41  
• Invest currently unneeded dollar liquidity; 42 and 
• Achieve long-term returns which preserve and enhance international 
purchasing power of national assets.43 
D.   Why Is the Spotlight Now on Sovereign Wealth Funds? 
SWFs have been extensively covered in the news since 2006.  Some 
SWFs have existed for decades and have been quietly, and not entirely 
secretly, investing internationally.  For example, it is known that Temasek, a 
SWF established by Singapore in 1974, has long held major interests in 
regional entities such as Singapore Airlines and SingTel.44  But Temasek 
and other early SWFs also invested internationally for decades without 
attracting adverse attention.  This Section explores the changes in the 
economic milieu and in the SWFs themselves that raised the profile of 
SWFs. 
The current high profile of SWFs is not explained by their size.  
Compared to other large investors, SWFs are relatively insignificant. 
  
 38. See infra App. A. 
 39. For example, SWFs from Iran, Kazakhstan, Qatar, and Kuwait share this stated 
goal.  See id. 
 40. For example, SWFs from Alaska and Botswana share this goal.  See id. 
 41. One such example is Vietnam’s SWF.  See id. 
 42. For example, SAFE and the State General Reserve Fund of Oman share this goal.  
See id. 
 43. For example, SWFs from Azerbaijan, Brazil, Norway, China (CIC), and Abu 
Dhabi (Mubadala) share this goal.  See id. 
 44. “SingTel is the largest company listed on the Singapore Exchange with a market 
capitalization of more than S$40 billion.”  See SingTel, Company Profile, 
http://home.singtel.com/about_singtel/company_profile/default.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 
2009).   
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Table 145 
 
 
Table 1 reveals that while SWFs have some $3.8 trillion in assets under 
management, pension funds worldwide have an estimated $19 trillion of 
assets under management.  Insurance companies have approximately $21 
trillion in investable assets, and investment funds of all sorts manage an 
estimated $22 trillion. 
Notwithstanding the comparatively insignificant size of investable funds 
controlled by SWFs, their sudden appearance in the equity markets and the 
massive size of their individual investment positions has triggered concerns 
in both the popular media and in the U.S. Congress.  The unique 
characteristic of a SWF investment is that it is controlled by a sovereign 
whose true present and future investment intentions are unknown and 
unknowable.   The economic, diplomatic, and political interests of a 
sovereign will almost always coincide with the goals of a SWF, but they 
need not always do so.  At times, diplomatic or political interests could 
trump traditional investment goals.  This lack of knowledge makes it 
possible for Congress and the media to see SWFs as a threat.  
In principle, SWF investments should be managed with a multi-year 
horizon, with investments made for the long term, and with the goal of 
wealth maximization within the fund.  To date there is no evidence to 
suggest that any SWF, no matter how opaque its operations, has acted in 
any instance for political or diplomatic, or non-economic, purposes.46 
  
 45. Steffen Kern, Sovereign Wealth Funds: State Investments During the Financial 
Crisis, DEUTSCHE BANK RES., July 15, 2009, at 1, 5, available at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000 
244283.pdf.  Table 1 is used with authorization from its Author.   The figure for SWFs has 
been updated with information from the SWF Institute to reflect SWF assets estimated as of 
August 2009.  See infra App A. 
 46. Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the Regulation 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, BERKLEY CENTER FOR L. & SOC’Y 10 (2008); Ashby H.B. Monk, 
Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance, 13 
(Working Paper, May 1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/bastract=1134862; Opinion of 
the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The Impact of Private Equity, Hedge and 
Sovereign Funds on Industrial Change in Europe,’ ¶ 5.6 (Oct. 15, 2006), 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu (“There is no substantive evidence that SWFs make investments 
for political or strategic motives.”). 
Hedge Funds $ 1.0 
SWFs $ 3.8 
Pension Funds $ 19 
Insurance Co. $ 21 
Mutual funds  $ 22 
Global GDP $ 61 
 
(in trillions of U.S. dollars)
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Nearly every publicly-held enterprise welcomes passive long-term 
investors.  Any large investor could threaten an unwelcome change of 
control.  Typically this threat is a private matter between these parties and 
of little interest to the government or the public.  With SWFs, however, the 
question is not simply whether the SWF is interested in gaining control of 
an entity, but whether such an investor might one day use its influence or 
outright control over an investee company to further the diplomatic policies 
or political interests of the sovereign.  After all, SWFs do not answer to or 
seek investment funds from other investors. SWFs are ultimately 
responsible to a sovereign with political and other interests. 
Although lack of enforceable transparency rules makes this point 
impossible to determine, SWFs traditionally sought to protect their cash 
surpluses by investing in risk-free U.S. Treasury instruments.  Treasury 
bonds, bills, and notes, together with U.S. agency instruments,47 provided 
the ultimate in financial security and stability for offshore and domestic 
holders of the U.S. dollar.  When a SWF invests in debt or equity 
instruments issued by private or public companies, there is seldom an 
obligation for them to disclose such investments.  This is not a unique or 
threatening feature of funds controlled by a foreign sovereign.  It is also the 
status of private investors. 
We can better understand the sudden, recent rise to media and political 
prominence of the SWFs when we consider three factors: (i) the rapid 
growth of SWFs in the twenty-first century; (ii) the marked increased in 
their publicly disclosed investments since 2004; and (iii) the low returns 
available on U.S. Treasury and agency instruments over the last few years. 
Two recently aborted investments focused public attention on SWFs.48  
These affairs also contributed to the notoriety SWFs now have. 
Chart 1 below, prepared by Steffen Kern at Deutsche Bank Research, 
illustrates the phenomenal rise of SWF investments after 2003.  Because 
there are no mandatory disclosure rules applicable to SWFs, the data 
utilized in this chart reflects only that small portion of SWF investments 
that has become public.  The lack of transparency of SWFs generally is not 
limited to investments made or portfolio holdings.  This absence of 
verifiable data on SWFs as a category is complete.49  It applies to the overall 
size of SWFs, portfolio allocations, their individual investment goals and 
philosophies, historical investment performance, as well as other categories.  
  
 47. See infra note 51. 
 48. See infra text following note 66. 
 49. One of the more transparent SWFs is the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation Pte Ltd (“GIC”).  Its policy on disclosures is set forth in its first annual report, 
issued in 2008, twenty-seven years after it was created.   “As the Government of Singapore is 
the owner of the funds that GIC manages, we take our lead from the Government regarding 
the disclosure of any information on the funds.”  GOV’T OF SING. INV. CORP., 2008 SUMMARY 
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008). 
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Nevertheless, Chart 1 starkly reveals another cause of the current focus on 
SWFs. 
 
Chart 150 
 
 
Chart 1 reveals that from 1995 through 2003, known SWF investments 
aggregated about $10 billion.  Throughout this early period there are only 
two years when these investments exceeded $1 billion.  In 1999, it is 
estimated that a total of $2 billion was invested by SWFs; in 2001, this 
estimate is $4 billion.  Dramatic changes appear after 2003, as SWFs 
accumulated more assets and sought higher returns than those offered by 
U.S. treasuries and related instruments.  During 2004, the aggregate of all 
known investments made by SWFs grew to $8 billion.  These investments 
jumped to $19 billion in 2005, $35 billion in 2006, $44 billion in 2007, and 
  
 50. Kern, supra note 45, at 13 (indicating that the information presented in Chart 1 is 
based upon transactions occurring between 1995 and 2009 as reported by Dealogic involving 
at least one state-sponsored investor on the acquirer side.  The reported transactions are 
likely to entail only a fraction of the transaction de facto undertaken by such vehicles, many 
of which are not publically disclosed.  The data presented here should, therefore, be 
understood as tentative indicators of broad trends).  Chart 1 is reprinted with the permission 
of its Author.   
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$58 billion in 2008.  This explosive growth explains, in part, the 
significantly higher profile SWFs now have.   
E.   Explaining the Explosion in Disclosed Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investments 
Two contributing factors explain this increase in disclosed investments: 
(i) the unprecedentedly low rates of return offered by U.S. Treasury and 
related instruments and (ii) the rapid accumulation of assets under 
management by the SWFs. Until recently the typical investment for excess 
dollar holdings of foreign nations was the safest and most secure 
investments available: U.S. Treasuries or other instruments, such as those 
issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and certain 
other government supported enterprises (“GSEs”).51  The U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board’s Open Market Committee (colloquially referred to as the 
“Fed”) manages certain short term interest rates applicable to commercial 
banks.  The Fed sets the “discount rate,”52 the benchmark for many other 
market-based interest rates in the United States.  This discount rate was 
lowered to combat the recession of 2001, and was then maintained by the 
Fed at unusually low levels for several years as Chart 2 reveals.53  The 
  
 51. See, e.g., Foreign Holdings of U.S. Government Securities and the U.S. Current 
Account: CBO Testimony before the U.S. House of Reps. Comm. on the Budget, June 26, 
2007 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Dir., CBO), 
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2007/06.26orszag.pdf.  The housing GSEs are the 
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks; Federal National Mortgage Association;  Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation; Government National Mortgage Association; Farming: Federal 
Farm Credit Banks; and Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.  See Kevin R. Kosar, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs): An Institutional Overview, RS21663, Apr. 23, 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21663.pdf.  Prior to September 2008, no GSE obligations 
were directly supported by the U.S. Government.  See Press Release, Statement by Secretary 
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect 
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm.  The added risk from the lack of an outright 
guarantee meant that such instruments returned a slightly higher yield.  See Federal Subsidies 
for the Housing GSEs: CBO Testimony  before the U.S. House of Reps. Subcomm. on Fin. 
Serv., May 23, 2001 (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/052301cr.pdf.  Notwithstanding the lack of such 
guarantee the investment community considered these agency instruments attractive because 
of their higher yield and the assumption that they were backed by an “implicit” guarantee 
from the U.S. Treasury.  Id.  
 52. The Federal Reserve at times uses the term “discount rate” to mean the primary 
credit rate. Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, The Discount Rate, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009). 
 53. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Graph, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=FEDFUNDS (last visited Oct. 29, 2009). 
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discount rate was later set even lower as the Fed battled the economic crisis 
in 2008. 
 
Chart 254 
 
 
These low Fed discount rates, in turn, meant that the investment return 
on U.S. Treasury and related obligations was unusually low.  Such low 
returns logically led SWFs to seek for higher returns elsewhere.  Higher 
returns were available in equity interests in Western companies.  The 
chosen companies had to be large to absorb the SWFs’ large investments 
and thus were likely to have a high public profile. 
A second factor contributing to the post-2003 investment surge shown in 
Table 1 was a large increase in commodity prices. Chart 355 illustrates the 
remarkable rise in the price of crude oil, which accounts for most of the 
commodity funded SWFs.  In the ten years from 1998 to 2007, crude oil 
benchmark prices rose from less than $20 to more than $140 per barrel.56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 54. Id.  
 55. See infra Chart 3. 
 56. These prices are specifically for barrels of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at 
Cushing. 
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Chart 357 
 
There was no apparent end to this trend of rising crude oil prices in 2006.  
With projections into the future of many more trillions soon to be held by 
SWFs,58 headline writers, movie producers, and other commercially-
motivated individuals announced that SWFs would shortly “own the 
world!”59  
There is no consensus view of the total value of SWF assets.  Different 
estimates arise from the varying definitions of SWFs and the lack of 
transparency of most of these funds.60 The International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) estimated that SWFs’ controlled assets valued at $500 billion in 
1990.61  SWF assets doubled to $1 trillion by 2005.62  In mid-2009, the SWF 
Institute estimated that the fifty-two funds it follows controlled assets 
valued at $3.8 trillion.63   It was in this context that the commodity 
exporting nations and Asian nations with large balance of trade surpluses64 
  
 57. EIA, International Energy Price Information, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ 
international/prices.html#Crude (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). 
 58. James Surowiecki, Sovereign Wealth World, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2007, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/11/26/071126ta_talk_surowiecki (estimating 
that SWFs would be in control of $12 trillion in assets by 2015). 
 59. Supra notes 4–10. 
 60. See infra discussion in Part IV, The Santiago Principles. 
 61. Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 44 FIN. DEV. (2007), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/straight/htm. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See infra App. A. 
 64. Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China are some of those among the Asian nations 
with trade  balances.  China was estimated to be increasing its foreign currency reserves by 
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sought to increase the historically low returns on U.S. Treasuries and related 
instruments.65 
1.   High Profile Investments 
Public awareness of SWFs was also enhanced by two proposed 
transactions that developed into center-ring attractions in media circuses.  
The first was a transaction involving the Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Company (“CNOOC”) which hit the news in June 2005.  CNOOC is not a 
SWF, but the Chinese government owns 70% of it, and CNOOC is therefore 
referred to as a state-owned enterprise (“SOE”).  This ownership by China 
is sufficient to perfect the analogy to a formal SWF and to the threat, if any, 
posed by SWFs.66 
Within weeks of the resolution of the CNOOC affair, a second 
controversial transaction became public.  Dubai Ports World (“DPW”), a 
subsidiary of a SWF based in Dubai, stumbled into an inexplicable political 
fight, best explained by the weakness of the Executive Branch and “the 
exigencies of the electoral calendar,”67 rather than the substance of what 
Congress claimed to have discovered.  When the DPW affair subsided in the 
spring of 2006, crude oil prices were still steadily climbing and the 
supposed threat to the American way of life posed by these large 
accumulations of U.S. dollars in the hands of foreigners was a common 
theme heard by anyone exposed to the media. 
2.   CNOOC — Unocal  — Chevron 
In 2005, CNOOC made an $18.5 billion offer for Unocal, a California-
based oil company.68  This offer to Unocal stockholders trumped an 
outstanding $16 billion offer from Chevron Oil Company, also based in 
California.  The CNOOC bid enlivened politics and consumed the media for 
weeks during the summer of 2005. 
The New York Times reported: “The offer is . . . the latest symbol of 
China’s growing economic power and of the soaring ambitions of its 
corporate giants, particularly when it comes to the energy resources it needs 
  
$1 billion per day in 2007.  Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options for U.S. 
Trade Policy, RL32165, Jan. 9, 2008, at 9, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32165.pdf. 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 66. As one commentator has noted, in the end CNOOC is controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party.  Jason Buhi, Negocio de China: Building upon the Santiago Principles to 
Form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation, 39 H. K. L. 
J. 197, 202  (2009). 
 67. O’Brien, supra note 50, at 1236. 
 68. Unocal was founded in 1890 as the Union Oil Company of California. 
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desperately to continue feeding its rapid growth.”69  CNOOC said its offer 
represents a premium of about $1.5 billion over the value of Unocal’s deal 
with Chevron after a $500 million breakup fee.70 
The New York Times also reported that “Two Republican representatives 
from California, Richard W. Pombo and Duncan Hunter, wrote a letter last 
week to President Bush urging that the transaction be scrutinized on the 
grounds of national security.”71  The California politicians noted in their 
letter to President Bush: 
As the world energy landscape shifts, we believe that it is critical to 
understand the implications for American interests and most especially, 
the threat posed by China’s governmental pursuit of world energy 
resources. The United States increasingly needs to view meeting its energy 
requirements within the context of our foreign policy, national security and 
economic security agenda.72 
Reacting to the intensive media attention generated by its bid, CNOOC 
promptly pledged to continue Unocal’s practice of selling all of the oil and 
gas Unocal produced in the United States to customers in the United 
States.73 
Facing a U.S. domestic political furor fed by Chevron lobbyists in 
Washington and its public relations firms, CNOOC ultimately withdrew its 
bid and issued the following statement: “The unprecedented political 
opposition . . . was regrettable and unjustified . . . . This political 
environment has made it very difficult for us to accurately assess our chance 
of success, creating a level of uncertainty that presents an unacceptable risk 
to our ability to secure this transaction.”74  Once the CNOOC threat had 
  
 69. David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bid for 
U.S. Corporation, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/ 
business/worldbusiness/23unocal.html?_r=1. 
 70. Id. 
A fee paid if a party voluntarily backs out of a deal to sell or 
purchase a business or a business's assets.  Termination fees are 
usually negotiated and agreed on as part of corporate merger or 
acquisition negotiations. The fee is designed to protect the 
prospective buyer and to deter the target corporation from 
entertaining bids from other parties. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 215, 1609 (8th ed. 2004) (directing readers to the definition of 
“termination fee” in order to define “break-up fee”). 
 71. Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 69. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Associated Press, China’s CNOOC Drops Bid for Unocal: Chinese Oil Firm 
Cites ‘Political Environment’ in the U.S., MSNBC, Aug. 2, 2005, http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/8795682/page/1/. 
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been dealt with, Chevron completed its acquisition of Unocal, raising its bid 
slightly.75    
3.   Dubai Ports World 
Just a few months after the CNOOC threat to the American way of life 
was eliminated in August 2005, another foreign threat appeared. Temasek, a 
Singapore SWF, sought to buy the British ports operator, Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (“P&O”).  Its offer for P&O, which 
managed ports in eighteen countries, including six major East coast ports in 
the United States,76 was ultimately topped by a bid from DPW. Once 
Temasek withdrew from the bidding,77 DPW voluntarily notified CFIUS 78 
that it would acquire P&O.  As is detailed in Part III of this Article, the 
CFIUS process includes an initial thirty day review that is followed by a 
more exhaustive forty-five day investigation if national security issues are 
raised. 79 
DPW fully briefed representatives of all of the CFIUS Executive Branch 
agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and interested 
national intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  Following the initial 
review, CFIUS approved DPW’s acquisition of P&O.80 
At the end of 2005, confidence in President George W. Bush and the 
Executive Branch was at a near record low as the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan grew more unpopular.   Once members of Congress, ever-
cognizant of mid-term Congressional elections, became aware that CFIUS 
had authorized the P&O acquisition, they did not miss the opportunity to 
  
 75. People’s Daily Online, Unocal Reject CNOOC After Chevron Raises Takeover 
Offer, July 21, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/21/eng20050721_ 
197449.html.   Chevron raised its offer from $16.5 billion to $17.1 billion, or $63 dollars per 
share in cash and stock, and increased the cash portion to 40% from 25%.  Id.  Unocal’s 
board voted to accept Chevron’s sweetened offer, and rejected a still higher all-cash offer 
from CNOOC worth $67 dollars per share.  Id.  While CNOOC’s offer was higher than 
Chevron’s, the Unocal Board of Directors recommended the Chevron transaction which was 
approved by shareholders.  Id. 
 76. Those six major East Coast ports are New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, New Orleans, and Miami.  Press Release, Rosa L. DeLauro, Rep., U.S. House of 
Representatives, DeLauro Co-Sponsors Legislation to Halt Dubai Port Deal (Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://delauro.house.gov/release.cfm?id=1212. 
 77. Rival Bows out of P&O Battle, BBC NEWS, Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4700144.stm. 
 78. See infra Part II, CFIUS procedures. 
 79. See infra Part III text accompanying notes 137, 139. 
 80. Patrick McGeehan, Despite Fears, A Dubai Company Will Help Run Ports In 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/ 
nyregion/17ports.html (“Stewart Baker, assistant secretary for policy at the Department of 
Homeland Security, said his department had no information about Dubai Ports World that 
justified an objection to the deal.  Indeed, he said, the company has cooperated with the 
department in its efforts to secure American ports and ships in foreign ports.  ‘We did not 
find derogatory information in our review,’ he said.”). 
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demonstrate their patriotism by opposing the acquisition.  In what I 
characterize as both politics as usual and Congressional racial profiling, 
Democrats and Republicans denounced CFIUS for approving the DPW 
transaction without a full investigation.  These critics asserted that the 
United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a member, was a state supporter of 
terrorism.81   
President Bush pointed out that port security was the responsibility of the 
U.S. Coast Guard, Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and that management of ports by P&O prior to or following a 
sale to DPW would have no impact on the security of our ports.82  The 
Administration explained that DPW had been the first Middle Eastern entity 
to join the multinational Container Security Initiative, a program designed 
to protect global trade from terrorism.83    The public was also informed that 
Dubai had been the first to join the Department of Energy’s Megaports 
Initiative, a nuclear nonproliferation program aimed at stopping illicit 
shipments of nuclear and radioactive material.84 
Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became involved in this 
“perfect storm” of domestic politics.85   Peter Pace, a Marine Corps four-star 
general, dismissed the terror-link allegations. “In everything that we have 
asked and worked with [the UAE] on, they have proven to be very, very 
solid partners.”86 
Once P&O shareholders approved the sale in early March, to assuage 
fears generated by the politicians and the media, DPW voluntarily submitted 
to the further forty-five day CFIUS investigation demanded by 
Congressional critics, the very investigation CFIUS had determined was 
unnecessary.87 The November elections were just seven months away, and 
the House Appropriations Committee, apparently eager to demonstrate that 
  
 81. “Mr. Schumer said that he was concerned that the company could be infiltrated 
by terrorists with designs on exploiting the vulnerability of American ports.  He noted that 
the September 11 attacks were financed in part by money that passed though banks in the 
United Arab Emirates.”  Id.  
 82. Press Release, George W. Bush, Pres., White House Fact Sheet: The CFIUS 
Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb. 22, 2006), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060222-11.html. 
 83. The Initiative implemented information-sharing and scanning technologies, as 
well as other administrative and technological methods, including pre-screening of 
containers prior to shipment. 
 84. Nat’l Nuclear Sec. Admin., Megaports Initiative, 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1641.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2009). 
 85. WILLIAM MIRACKY ET AL., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3, 18 (2008), http://www.altassets.com/ 
pdfs/Monitor_SWF_Report.pdf. 
 86. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States-UAE Bilateral Relationship 
(Feb. 23, 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2006/61914.htm. 
 87. Press Release, DP World (Feb. 26, 2006), www.dpworld.com (follow “Media 
Centre”; then follow “News Releases”; then follow “News Releases 2006”; then click on 
hyperlink for Feb. 26 Press Statement). 
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they could not be outmaneuvered by the unpopular President Bush, CFIUS, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and DPW, overwhelmingly approved a 
legislative amendment prohibiting the DPW transaction.  This action was 
rendered veto-proof because it was attached to an appropriation of funds for 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.88  Claiming to enhance national security, 
patriotic Members of Congress courageously jumped in where the War on 
Terror President, multiple agencies of the Executive Branch, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no need to go.  Thus, Congress 
heroically acted to prohibit a change in management of U.S. ports from 
“Brits” to “Arabs.”  “The two parties seemed to be more interested in 
gaining recognition that their party was stronger on national security issues 
than they were in learning the actual effects that the transaction would 
produce.  It was an election year after all.”89   
F.   Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the 2007 Economic 
Slowdown 
The CNOOC and DPW affairs raised public awareness of SWF 
investments.  While we do know of the recent increase in investments by 
SWFs in public companies, we know very little about any other investments 
by SWFs.  If we accept the estimate of $3.8 trillion as the size of SWF 
investable assets in mid-2009 and the projection of $1 trillion as the annual 
rate of increase of SWF assets in future years,90 there can be no doubt that 
the SWFs lack of transparency hides a great deal.  As the economic crisis 
began to develop at the close of 2006 and early in 2007, the problem of how 
SWFs could earn acceptable returns on their ever-increasing amounts of 
investable funds remained.   
The subprime mortgage crisis became apparent in the United States in 
early 2007.   U.S. housing prices had stopped rising at their unprecedented 
pace of the previous few years, and the market for securitized mortgages 
and other derivative instruments created from mortgages and mortgage 
derivatives that had been marketed as risk-free, collapsed.  The world’s 
largest commercial and investment banks, having fully imbibed the 
intoxicating, virtually risk free securitized mortgage instruments Wall Street 
alchemists had concocted, found that at that moment these securities had 
little market value. This collapse in value created a desperate need for bank 
capital.  The somnolent regulatory agencies of the leading developed 
nations made the same discovery at this time.  As had happened in earlier 
banking crises, bank regulators could not or would not close these 
  
 88. House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deal, FOX NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187147,00.html. 
 89. Waseam Azmeh, Sovereign Wealth Funds (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author at MSU College of Law). 
 90. Surowiecki, supra note 58. 
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institutions.  They had become undercapitalized by tens of billions but were 
considered “too big to fail.” 
SWFs were well positioned to be the source of the required additional 
bank capital. Faced with the need for increasing the return on their 
portfolios, SWF managers understood the opportunity presented by the 
banks’ predicament: banks were under regulatory pressure to offer favorable 
terms to secure such investments, and the SWFs had the cash.  Investing in 
the world’s leading banks would give participating SWFs new credibility 
and stature in the global financial community.  What could be more 
attractive than an investment in the premier financial institutions in the 
world’s largest, most successful economies?  Equity investments in 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Standard 
Chartered Bank, and UBS provided quite favorable returns, especially in 
light of the rate of return available on U.S. Treasuries and related 
instruments.  The fact that the U.S. Government and other leading nations 
had, explicitly or implicitly, deemed these institutions “too big to fail”91 was 
an important added bonus.  The cash-gorged SWFs did not miss this 
opportunity to take supposedly ultra-safe positions in financial institutions, 
which had been household names for generations.  The investments in 
western money center financial institutions set out in Table 2 are indicative 
of the opportunities seized by the SWFs. 
 
Table 292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 91. Patrice Hill, Citigroup, Other Banks in Trouble, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007,  
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/21/citigroup-other-banks-in-new-
trouble/print/ (“While the banks’ woes are real and growing, Mr. Beales[, an investment 
analyst,] said the drubbing of bank shares this week has been overdone.  ‘It’s highly unlikely 
that the end game for Citi or its big rivals is collapse,’ he said. ‘They remain too big to 
fail.’”). 
 92. See Kern, supra note 45; MONITOR GROUP, supra note 22. 
Financial Institution Billions Invested by all SWFs 
Deutsche Bank $  1.8 
Standard Chartered $  4 
Morgan Stanley $  5 
Merrill Lynch $  6.4 
Citigroup $17.5 
UBS $24.2
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G.   Financial Crisis: Sovereign Wealth Funds Stabilize Financial 
Institutions 
Through the first months of 2008, the financial community, the business 
press, and government officials dealt with the instability in the global 
banking system as merely the most recent, although perhaps more severe, 
version of prior episodes of banking instability brought on by real estate 
related problems.  Parallels were drawn to the savings and loan problems in 
the United States in the late 1980s.    The trigger for bank losses this time 
was subprime mortgages, which had been packaged and repackaged as 
securitized investments, and which the banks had purchased in the search 
for higher yields and larger personal paydays. 
H.   Mortgage Problems Become a Crisis 
Concern about the stability of banks and the international financial 
system developed during 2007 and grew more serious in early 2008.  In 
mid-March 2008, however, the global economy began to change for the 
worst.  Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, which, like 
many other financial institutions, had been funding its capital needs in the 
very liquid overnight-borrowing market, suddenly became a pariah to 
lenders.  On Monday, March 10, a rumor spread that Bear Stearns was in 
trouble, and by Thursday, March 13, more than $15 billion in hedge fund 
prime brokerage accounts had been withdrawn from the firm.93  This 
quickly led to disaster.  Bear Stearns suddenly found it nearly impossible to 
rollover its overnight borrowings.  An emergency rescue of Bear Stearns 
was arranged by federal authorities over the March 15–16 weekend.  
JPMorgan Chase, the one major bank not threatened by high exposure to the 
subprime mortgage problems plaguing the industry, with $30 billion in 
support from the Federal Reserve Bank, acquired Bear Stearns for $2 per 
share.94 
The economic crisis continued to deteriorate over the next six months.  
On September 8, 2008, the world learned of the demise of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.95  Seven days later, Lehman Brothers96 filed for bankruptcy 
  
 93. Steven M. Davidoff & Daniel Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463, 473–83 (2009).  
 94. Within days the acquisition price was increased to $10 per share.  For the 
fascinating story of the reasons for this increase see STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS OF WAR 
145–46 (2009). 
 95. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 2301-
04, 122 Stat. 2805 (2008) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase securities 
and other obligations of these mortgage funders) (Act was passed on Aug. 27, 2008). 
 96. Lehman Brothers faced huge losses arising out of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
In the first half of 2008, Lehman stock lost almost 75% of its value. However, on August 22, 
shares in Lehman closed up sharply on reports that the Korea Development Bank was 
considering buying the failing bank. However, when the Korea Development Bank did not 
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protection, and the true condition of American International Group, Inc., 
which by 2009 had received more than $160 billion in federal rescue 
support, became public. 
III.   FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICA: ESSENTIAL FOR THREE 
CENTURIES 
Foreign investment is a vital component of American prosperity.  This 
began in 1607 when shareholders of the Virginia Company sent settlers to 
Jamestown in the New World in search of wealth.  Foreign nations funded 
the American Revolution out of political and commercial rivalry with Great 
Britain.  The Bank of the United States was 62% owned by foreigners in 
1803.97  European debt and equity investments greatly accelerated the 
development of our railroads and created many mining, meatpacking, and 
other industries in the nineteenth century.   
The long history of foreign investment in the United States includes 
many federal laws restricting foreign investment. Early examples are the 
1841 Preemption Act98 and the 1872 Mining Act,99 which reflect attempts to 
regulate the settlement of the vast open lands west of the Appalachians.  
They were not a response to national security threats to a nation protected 
by thousands of miles of ocean.  Such restrictions did little to reduce foreign 
investment.100   
Limitations on foreign investment accelerated in the twentieth century.  
Congress enacted the Pickett Act in 1909 to limit foreign claims on western 
oil-producing land.101  In 1912, Congress authorized the president to restrict 
foreign investment in the fledgling radio industry.102  In the midst of World 
  
consummate the acquisition, Lehman shares collapsed again. The situation with Lehman 
grew worse on September 9, 2008, when the Dow Jones industrial average lost 300 points 
partly due to fears over the fate of Lehman.  In addition, even though the U.S. government 
had previously arranged the rescue of Bear Stearns and had just bailed out Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae by announcing hundreds of billions of dollars in support from the U.S. Treasury, 
the government determined not to assist Lehman.  See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 93. 
 97. SAMUEL BLODGET, ECONOMICA: A STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 198 (1806). 
 98. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455–56 (repealed in 1891). 
 99. The 1872 Federal Mining Act intended to add incentive to exploration of western 
lands by creating a claim-patent process for land acquisition.  The Act added “proof of 
citizenship” as a part of the process, although that seems to have been meant to incentivize 
Americans to set up companies for foreign investment.  General Mining Act of 1872 30 
U.S.C. §§ 22–47 (2006). 
 100. GAO, supra note 23, at 18. 
 101. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (repealed in 1943). 
 102. President Woodrow Wilson seized control over all U.S. foreign-owned radio 
stations in 1917 under the Radio Act of 1912.  Later, the General Electric Company spun-off 
the Radio Corporation of America which had been formed as a domestic monopoly at the 
urging of the U.S. Navy.  EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 10 (2006). 
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War I, President Woodrow Wilson seized control of foreign-owned radio 
stations.103 
In 1920, Congress enacted the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, which limited 
a foreign oil company’s ability to drill in the United States by requiring 
them to lease the land from the Government.104  After World War II, with 
Europe’s capital base destroyed, the United States became the major source 
of global investment capital.  As Europe and Japan gradually became more 
prosperous, the thriving American consumer economy attracted increasing 
amounts of foreign investment. 
A.   The Impact of Recent International Developments 
The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (“OPEC”) in 1973 introduced a totally new category of investor.  
The embargo resulted in a significant increase in the price of crude oil, 
which resulted in a major transfer of wealth to OPEC members, particularly 
in the Middle East.  These “petro-dollars” were recycled by their new 
owners back to the oil importing industrialized nations, especially the 
United States, where most funds were invested in traditional “risk-free” 
U.S. Treasury and related instruments.  Though the 1973 oil embargo 
stimulated public discussion about the threat to America from the 
accumulation of dollars in the OPEC countries, the petro-dollars invested in 
the United States were not viewed as a threat.  There was no indication that 
Middle Eastern investors intended to buy control of American companies.   
Public attention focused on the unfamiliar concept of foreigners having 
enormous amounts of investable dollars.  It was assumed that these 
foreigners had the same investment goals as other investors: an increase in 
wealth. 
A further wave of foreign investment occurred in the early 1980s.  A 
portion of this investable cash derived from a second abrupt increase in the 
cost of crude oil triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.  A new 
and different foreign investment threat from Asia emerged shortly 
thereafter. 
By 1980 Japan had fully recovered from the devastation of World War 
II, and in the late 1980s Japan modified its Foreign Exchange Control Law 
to permit Japanese citizens and companies to invest abroad more easily.105  
Over the next decade the Japanese yen strengthened against the U.S. dollar, 
making investments in the U.S. economy very attractive for Japanese 
investors.  By 1989, Japanese direct and portfolio investments accounted for 
  
 103. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, § 2, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927). 
 104. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2009). 
 105. See Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, http://www.japanlaw. 
info.forex/law/JS.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
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17% of all foreign investment in the United States.106  Japanese investments 
were sometimes large; some were quite conspicuous.107  The appearance of 
these large pools of foreign capital in the Middle East and Japan generated 
concern in the United States over foreign investment that remains strong 
today. 
B.   The Modern Approach to Investment by Foreign Investors 
The United States has enjoyed the benefits of foreign investment108 and 
has consistently espoused openness toward investments by foreigners.109  
The restrictions U.S. policy imposed on foreign investment were directed, 
until recently, at specific categories of activities and assets.110  Such 
restrictions were rooted in protecting investment opportunities for 
Americans, not the perception that our national security could be threatened 
by foreign investors. 
More recently, policy concerns have focused upon a concern for national 
security.  Earlier restrictions targeted foreigners as a broad category and did 
not focus on the unique characteristics of particular types of foreign 
investors.   U.S. legislators previously assumed, without analysis, that 
foreign investors were rational economic actors, seeking maximum returns 
from their investments in the United States.   The U.S. economic regulatory 
framework has been based upon the nature of the investment to be made, 
not upon the character of the foreign investor.111  We have assumed that 
investors seek wealth maximization.  An unstated assumption has been that 
all market participants, including foreigners, invest solely to increase their 
own wealth.  The increased investment activity of SWFs and SOEs112 has 
led to a reconsideration of this assumption. 
  
 106. Mira Wilkins, Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 
1879–1990, 64 BUS. HIST. REV. 585, 610 (1990). 
 107. Pebble Beach Golf Course and Rockefeller Center in New York City are 
prominent examples of high profile investments, perhaps chosen specifically because they 
were high profile. 
 108. GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES, GAO-08-320, (2008) (stating that other nations too have these 
restrictions).  Indeed, the United States is ranked relatively high on the list of nations and 
their openness to foreign investment.  Id.  
 109. See George W. Bush, Pres., State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/sou/index.html. 
 110. GAO, supra note 23. 
 111. Lawrence Summers, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, 
July 30, 2007, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2007/07/sovereign-fundshtml/. 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
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C.   The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
CFIUS is the backbone of America’s legislative efforts to protect the 
nation from any risk arising from foreign investments.  The current CFIUS 
process has evolved over more than three decades of practice and 
intermittent review of its authority and procedures.113 
 
1975 — The Establishment of CFIUS 
At the height of the first OPEC oil embargo in 1974, Congress mandated 
a study to investigate direct and portfolio investments in the United States 
by foreign persons and entities.114  The following year President Gerald 
Ford signed an Executive Order115 establishing an Executive Branch 
committee to review certain investments in the United States by foreign 
investors.  The focus was the risk presented by control of U.S companies by 
foreigners; there was no explicit concern about direct or indirect control of 
American businesses by foreign governments.  The government entity 
responsible for reviewing investments by foreigners was and remains 
CFIUS.   This Committee operates almost totally outside the public arena, 
but we do have some perspective on the level of CFIUS activity.116 In 2006, 
there were approximately 10,000 merger transactions in the United States.  
Of these, 1730 involved a foreign party, but only 113 required review by 
CFIUS.  According to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Kimmitt, 
not one of these CFIUS-reviewed transactions was blocked.117   
 
1988 — The Exon-Florio Amendment 
CFIUS operated pursuant to President Ford’s Executive Order for more 
than a decade. During the 1980’s, protection of American technology 
companies became a national security concern.  In 1988, Congress amended 
the Defense Production Act of 1950 by enacting the Exon-Florio 
Amendment,118 which empowered the President to investigate “mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers” that would result in a foreign person achieving 
control over a company or business119 where such control would impair 
national security.  Implementation and enforcement of Exon – Florio was 
delegated to CFIUS.120   
  
 113. While CFIUS has been a distinctly American response and is the focus of this 
Article, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has called for a CFIUS-like structure for the EU. 
Germany and France already have similar legislation in place. 
 114. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974). 
 115. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975). 
 116. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
 117. Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth and 
the World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 123 (2008). 
 118. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006). 
 119. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.302(b)(4), (e) (2009). 
 120. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1998) (designating CFIUS  
responsible for the implementation of the new Exon-Florio statute). 
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1993 — The Byrd Amendment 
Congressional concern that the Committee was not being aggressive about 
protecting American security led Senator Robert Byrd to propose new 
amendments to CFIUS authority.  The Byrd Amendment, enacted as section 
837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 
changed Section 721 of the Defense Production Act.121  The change required 
an investigation in cases where the acquirer is controlled by or acting on 
behalf of a foreign government and the acquisition “could result in control 
of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that could affect the 
national security of the [United States].”122   
 
2007 — FINSA 
In addition to the CNOOC and DPW transactions,123 there have been four 
recent additional proposed acquisitions that involved issues of national 
security but did not attract intense media attention.  These additional 
transactions were: 
• The sale of Tyco International’s undersea fiber-optic cable network 
to an Indian firm;124  
• The Chinese computer company Lenovo’s purchase of IBM’s 
personal computer business;  
• The proposed acquisition of a small internet security business, 
Sourcefire, Inc.,   by Check Point, an Israeli company, which did not 
proceed after an announcement that CFIUS opposed the 
transaction;125 and  
  
 121. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2006).  
 122. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J)  (amended by 
Pub. L. No.110-49, 121 Stat. 247 (2007)). 
 123. See infra Parts II.E.2–3. 
 124. In April 2005, CFIUS cleared the acquisition of Tyco International’s undersea 
fiber-optic cable network by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd., an Indian firm.   Videsh apparently 
agreed to data security guidelines with U.S. law enforcement and defense agencies as a 
condition of approval.  Leon B. Greenfield, The CFIUS Process: A Primer, THE THRESHOLD, 
(Winter 2005/2006), at 9. 
 125.  
Security company Check Point Software Technologies called off its 
planned $225 million acquisition of intrusion-prevention firm 
Sourcefire on Thursday, a week before a federal watchdog was 
scheduled to release a report which insiders say would have blocked 
the merger on the grounds of national-security interests. . . . The 
proposed Check Point acquisition was under initial review by the 
U.S. Treasury-led CFIUS, when the Associated Press broke the news 
that United Arab Emirates-based Dubai World Ports planned to close 
a deal which would have given the company responsibility for 
security at six major U.S. ports. The further investigation by CFIUS 
into Check Point’s proposed purchase of Sourcefire was announced 
the following day. 
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• The acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems, America’s third largest 
manufacturer of electronic voting machines, by Smartmatic, a 
company indirectly controlled by the Government of Venezuela, 
without CFIUS review.126  
 
Congress was spurred to take action by these four transactions, the 
CNOOC and DPW affairs, and the hundreds of billions of dollars that 
continued to accumulate in SWFs, both in the Middle East, from the ever-
increasing price of crude oil, and in Asia, from the balance of trade 
surpluses fed by debt-addicted American consumers’ insatiable appetite for 
more goods.  Congressional options included legislation that reduced 
America’s consumption of imported oil, addiction to consumer debt, or 
both.  Congress, however, preferred to focus on where the SWFs were 
investing, rather than on the unsustainable outflow of dollars.  In 2007 
Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security Act127 
(“FINSA”), which mandated new standards designed to bring CFIUS 
investment review procedures under more direct Congressional oversight. 
On behalf of the Committee, the Treasury Department issued final 
implementing regulations on November 14, 2008.  On December 8, 2008, 
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Investment Security published 
  
Robert Lemos, Check Point Calls off Sourcefire Buy, SECURITYFOCUS, Mar. 24, 2006, 
http://secuirtyfocus.com/news/11382. 
 126.  
[In November 2007], Sequoia Voting Systems, the nation’s third-
largest electronic voting machine maker, announced that the 
company had been sold to private U.S. investors.  This would be an 
unremarkable transaction except that the seller, Smartmatic 
Corporation, is a Venezuelan-owned company close to the 
government of Hugo Chávez.  And the sale was forced by a belated 
investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS).  But for the unprecedented unwinding of 
Smartmatic’s ownership — which almost did not happen — Chávez 
would be in a position to influence the outcome of next year’s 
presidential election. . . .  CFIUS opened an investigation only after 
Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), who chairs the subcommittee 
overseeing CFIUS and who co-authored FINSA, wrote a letter to 
then-Treasury Secretary John Snow inquiring whether the 
Venezuelan government could use Sequoia to manipulate U.S. 
elections.  Maloney cited the fact that the Venezuelan state had 
invested in Smartmatic’s affiliates, the company’s current ownership 
was buried in a labyrinth of offshore trusts, and revelations that 
Sequoia had flown fifteen Venezuelan nationals to Chicago to 
tabulate votes in a local election. 
Richard Brand & Ilya Shapiro, A Step in the Right Direction, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 19, 
2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C014% 
5C494abixg.asp. 
 127. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Public L. No. 110-49, 
121 Stat. 246 (2007) (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. App. 2170(f) (2007)). 
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“Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.”128  CFIUS now 
operates as prescribed by FINSA. 
1.   CFIUS Membership  
CFIUS membership, as established by the statute, consists of the heads of 
several Executive Branch departments and offices.  These are the 
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of State, and the 
Department of Energy.  The Treasury Secretary serves as the chair of 
CFIUS.  In addition, two agencies have membership as non-voting, ex-
officio members.  Those are the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Labor.  Other heads of agencies, departments, or offices may 
be added as the President deems appropriate. 129 
2.   CFIUS Transactions 
CFIUS is charged with reviewing and reporting to Congress on any 
proposed “covered transaction”.  A “covered transaction” is any transaction 
that “could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States by a foreign government.”130 
CFIUS retains the flexibility to determine control on a case by case 
basis.  Will control be found if the foreigner does not have a majority of the 
board of directors or the formal right to nominate candidates for board and 
executive positions?  How should convertible securities be handled?  What 
if the SWF is the principal creditor of a debt-strapped defense contractor? 
There is no end to the variations and perturbations careful lawyers may 
propose as parties attempt to arrange the best possible positions for their 
clients while not triggering the murky CFIUS standards.  The lack of a 
bright line definition of control is no accident.  Any competent lawyer can 
work around a clear, bright line test.  As Paul Rose has observed: “The 
uncertainty of the rules’ application will likely encourage SWFs to maintain 
their shareholding strategy of passivity and understated influence.”131 
  
 128. Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by the CFIUS, 73 
Fed. Reg. 74567 (Dec. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800). 
 129. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(J). 
 130. Id. at app. § 2170(a)(3).  
 131. See Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Active or Passive Investors?, 118 YALE 
L. J. 104 (Pocket Part 2008).  To date, SWF investments have been carefully arranged so as 
not to trigger reporting and review thresholds of other U.S. legislation.  Id.  As one example, 
SWF investments in financial institutions have been “passive” and have been kept below the 
10%t reporting threshold of the Bank Holding Company Act.  Id.  
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FINSA has expanded CFIUS’ scope of authority by specifying that the 
term “national security” includes issues relating to “homeland security;”132 
defining “homeland security” to include America’s “critical 
infrastructure;”133 and providing that the term “critical infrastructure” 
encompasses “critical technologies”, which term encompasses “technology, 
components[,] or items essential to national defense.”134 
Another series of issues is presented by the CFIUS element of acting “on 
behalf of a foreign government.”  Exactly when is a nominally private entity 
or party to be considered acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign?  Russian 
oligarchs, fabulously wealthy individuals and families from the United Arab 
Emirates or Saudi Arabia, and Chinese SOEs are just a few examples of this 
fertile area of CFIUS ambiguity.  
In contrast to this ambiguity, the regulations do make one thing clear, a 
10% or smaller holding of voting shares exempts a transaction from CFIUS 
review.135    
3.   CFIUS Procedures 
The formal CFIUS process has four steps.  The initial phase is notice to the 
Committee by the companies involved disclosing that a transaction is being 
considered.  The notice must include a description of the business that the 
domestic company does with U.S. Government agencies, if such business 
has possible national security ramifications.136  Second, a thirty-day 
“National Security Review”137 is then conducted under the direction of a 
lead Executive Branch department designated by CFIUS.   This review 
determines whether there are national security concerns.138  If national 
security concerns are identified or if the transaction is foreign government 
controlled and the parties wish to continue with the transaction, the 
Committee conducts a forty-five day investigation into the national security 
concerns as the third step of the process.139  As a practical matter, CFIUS 
may negotiate mitigation agreements and arrangements to satisfy the 
Committee that U.S. security interests will continue to be protected.  Such 
agreements may include ongoing covenants and obligations that can be later 
enforced by CFIUS. Finally, CFIUS issues a recommendation proposing “a 
Presidential decision to permit, suspend, or prohibit the acquisition.” 140 
  
 132. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5). 
 133. Id. app. § 2170(a)(5)–(6). 
 134. Id. app. § 2170(a)(7). 
 135. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2009). 
 136. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(3)(C). 
 137. Id. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E). 
 138. Id. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B). 
 139. Id. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)–(C).  
 140. Id. app. § 2170(d)(1). 
2009] Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds 95 
 
In reviewing a covered transaction that has national security 
implications, CFIUS considers a broad range of issues, including an 
extensive list of “national security factors” taken from the Defense 
Production Act.141  These “national security factors” include: 
 
• Domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; 
• The capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense 
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, 
technology, materials, and other supplies and services; 
• Control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens 
as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the 
requirements of national security; 
• The possible effects of the transaction on sales of military goods, 
equipment, or technology to a country that the Secretary of State has 
identified as supporting terrorism or as being of concern regarding  
proliferation of missiles or chemical and biological weapons; to a country 
that the Secretary of Defense has identified as posing a potential regional 
military threat to the interests of the United States; or to a country  listed on 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Special Country List142 or any successor list;  
• The potential effects of the transaction on U.S. international technological 
leadership in areas affecting U.S. national security:143 
  
 141. Id. app. § 2170(f). 
 142. Nuclear Non-Proliferation—Special Country List, 15 C.F.R. § 778, supp. 4 
(1996).  It should be noted, however, that this section was moved to 15 C.F.R. § 7988A, 
supp. 4 later in 1996 before being removed entirely, effective December 31, 1996.  See 
Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996) 
(made effective Nov. 1, 1996). 
 143. Critical sectors of technological leadership include: 
  1. Advanced Materials and Processing 
  1.1 Processes for Super Alloys, Polymers, etc. 
  1.2 Semiconductor Materials 
  1.3 Ceramics 
  1.4 Fiber-reinforced Composites and Metal Matrix Composites 
  1.5 Super Alloys 
  1.6 Polymeric Materials, Plastic Fabricators, Homogenous Injections, Extrusions 
  1.7 Energetic Materials (explosives, propellants, etc.) 
  1.8 Metamaterials (nanostructures with special properties) 
  2. Chemicals 
  3. Advanced Manufacturing 
  4. Information Technology 
  5. Telecommunications 
  6. Microelectronics 
  7. Semiconductor Fabrication Equipment 
  8. Electronics: Military Related 
  9. Biotechnology 
  10. Professional and Scientific Instruments 
  11. Aerospace and Surface Transportation 
  12. Energy 
  13. Space Systems 
  14. Marine Systems 
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• The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical 
infrastructure,144 including major energy assets;   
• The potential national security-related effects on U.S. critical 
technologies;145 
• Whether the covered transaction is a foreign government controlled 
transaction146 that could result in the control of a U.S. business by a foreign 
government or an entity controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign 
government; 
• A review of the current assessment of the adherence of the subject country 
to nonproliferation control regimes; the relationship of such country with 
the United States, specifically in its record on cooperating in count-
terrorism efforts; and the potential for transshipment of diversion of 
technologies with military applications, including an analysis of national 
export control laws and regulations; 
• The long-term projection of U.S. requirements for sources of energy and 
other critical resources and materials; and 
• Such other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be 
appropriate, generally, or in connection with a specific review or 
investigation.147 
IV.   THE SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
FINSA was the Congressional reaction to the perceived threat from the 
increase in size and impact of SWF investments in the United States.  Other 
nations were also concerned.   The OECD, representing most developed 
nations, also considered the challenge posed by this new, uncomprehended 
threat.  OECD concerns were similar to those expressed in the United 
States.  The large pools of SWF investable cash under the control and 
management of other nations present the risk that SWFs might not always 
act like private investors.148  This concern is not irrational, but presents a 
serious issue for responsible leaders of all nations.  There is the possibility 
that critical domestic economic resources might come under the control of 
SWFs or SOEs that could have political purposes or goals different from 
those of traditional private investors.  OECD concerns have focused on the 
  
2008 COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S. ANN. REP. 39 (2008). 
 144. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(6) (defining “critical infrastructure” as “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national 
security.”). 
 145. Id. app. § 2071(a)(7) (providing that “critical technologies” include “critical 
technology, critical components, or critical technology items essential to national defense.”). 
 146. Id. app. § 2170(f)(8). 
 147. Id. app. § 2170(f)(11). 
 148. See generally Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater 
Transparency and Accountability, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1 (Aug. 2007) 
(highlighting the fact that SWFs have the potential to complicate the thin line between public 
and private investment policy). 
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opacity of SWFs with respect to their investment goals, current plans, and 
ownership details.   
Early in 2008, the OECD prompted the IMF to take action.  The IMF 
cooperated with a group of twenty-six leading SWFs in organizing the IWG 
of SWFs.  The IWG mission was to prepare guidance that would allay the 
concerns of investee nations with respect to SWF investment activities.149  
By October 2008, the IWG produced its 24 Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices.150  The GAPP was intended “to identify [a] framework of 
generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate 
governance and accountability arrangements.”151 
The GAPP, also known as the “Santiago Principles,” are informative and 
reassuring to read, but as a document drafted by representatives of 
sovereign nations, they have absolutely no binding force and carry no 
meaningful weight.  As the IWG itself makes perfectly clear in its formal 
Introduction to the GAPP: “The GAPP is a voluntary set of principles and 
practices that the members of the IWG support and have either implemented 
or aspire to implement.”152  
The GAPP and this work of the IWG in coordination with the OECD and 
IMF need not be ignored.  Neither should it be relied upon.  The Santiago 
Principles have not had, and will not have, any meaningful, substantive 
impact on SWFs or their investments.  Each of the 24 principles set forth in 
the GAPP uses the verb “should.”  These principles do not relieve the 
concerns of those who perceive a threat from SWFs.153  While the dialog 
may have made SWF managers more aware of the concerns of investee 
states, the GAPP does not eliminate the risk that a SWF might use its 
investment power to act against the interests of another nation.  So long as 
  
 149. INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 
28–31 (Oct. 2008), http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf (providing a list 
of IWG Countries, SWFs, and institutions that participated in the IWG meetings).  See infra  
App. B. 
 150. There are in fact 24 Santiago Principles.  See generally Santiago Principles, 
supra note 149.   Only the hypothetical introducing this Article has a GAPP 25. 
 151. See for example GAPPs 5, 11, 12, 17, 20.  Id.  See infra App. B. 
 152. Santiago Principles, supra note 149, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 153. Indeed some commentators have derided the entire effort, perhaps losing focus 
on the inescapable reality of what “sovereign” means.   
What is disappointing is [the] utter ineffectiveness of the GAPP 
regime. The Principles accomplish nothing but a reiteration of the 
least common denominators of the status quo. It seems that the 
representatives of the Western free markets, in various states of 
dependency and desperation, suspended their reservations about the 
creeping resurgence of authoritarian capitalism to satisfy their 
national thirsts for liquidity. 
Buhi, supra note 66, at 198. 
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the word “sovereign” retains its current meaning,154  the risk presented by 
SWFs cannot be eliminated by proclaimed principles, or even promises 
made by entities that are ultimately instrumentalities of sovereign polities. 
V.   THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
One of the principal complaints the OECD investee nations have about 
SWFs is their near total lack of transparency.  Some opacity is typical of 
institutional investors.  For example, hedge funds are extremely protective 
of their financial privacy; they claim secrecy is vital to their trading 
strategies.  Investment companies that manage mutual funds and public 
employee retirement funds do disclose details of their portfolio holdings and 
investment performance, and they are required to undergo regular, 
independent audits.  
SWFs, on the other hand, as creatures of sovereign governments are free 
to do almost anything they like.  As Victor Fleischer has detailed, because 
they are owned by a sovereign government, SWFs are not even taxed by the 
Internal Revenue Service on their U.S. investment earnings or gains.155  
Speaking of his SWF’s transparency, the Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of China’s CIC said of the IWG’s GAPP: “We will increase 
transparency without harming the commercial interests of CIC. That is to 
say, it will be a gradual process . . . .  If we are transparent on everything, 
the wolves will eat us up.”156    
For all but a very few SWFs157 there is no official, independently audited 
information on their investments.  Verifiable details on total assets, 
investment philosophy and goals, portfolio allocation, or investment 
performance are simply not available.158  Accordingly, an exhaustive 
  
 154. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (defining sovereign as an “entity 
‘in which independent and supreme authority is vested’”); U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_693.html# 
(explaining that under a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, a state or state 
instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with 
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private 
persons). Black’s Law Dictionary defines sovereignty as, “The power to do everything in a 
state without accountability,. . . to make war or peace, to form treaties of alliance or of 
commerce with foreign nations, and the like.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (7th 
ed.1999).   
 155. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 
445 (2009). 
 156. China Investment Corp. Warns Western Governments Against Protectionism, 
FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/12/10/afx4424545.html. 
 157. For example, Norway, Alaska, Alabama, Wyoming, and New Mexico.  
Sovereign Wealth Institute, Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, http://www.swf 
institute.org/research/transparencyindex.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 158. The SWFs of Norway and New Zealand do provide much more information than 
other SWFs.  Nevertheless, SWFs argue, as do hedge funds, that business operating 
information must not be made available since this disadvantages the fund.   
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examination of the actual performance of SWFs and their behavior in the 
recent economic chaos is not possible.  But it is useful to review how the 
SWFs reacted to the worst decline in the equity markets since the Great 
Depression.  The analysis that follows reveals that despite unprecedented, 
multi-billion dollar losses, SWFs have not panicked and sold their worst 
performing holdings.  Indeed, the evidence we have confirms that, to date, 
SWFs have behaved as long-term, wealth-maximizing private investors. 
The long-term nature of SWF investments is confirmed by some 
remarkable statistics in the Deutsche Bank Report.  Over the fifteen years 
included in the Deutsche Bank SWF database, the gross value of all 
divestitures has been a modest $46 billion.159  With current SWF assets 
between $3 trillion and $4 trillion,160 this is a telling data point.  Many 
privately managed U.S. funds have 100% or higher turnover annually.   In 
this light the Deutsche Bank figure, amounting to less than 1.5% of current 
SWF assets over a fifteen-year period is astounding.161 This data 
persuasively establishes that SWFs have acted like long-term private 
investors, not hostile nations seeking to damage the economies of its 
enemies or pursuing commercial advantage for its own businesses.162 
An analysis of transactions completed by one group of SWFs was 
published by the combined resources of the Monitor Company Group LP 
and the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, an Italian economic research 
institute.  Monitor-FEEM identifies seventeen SWFs that meet its narrow 
definition of SWF.163  They tracked 1,158 of the transactions these funds 
have completed since 1995.164  In April, 2009, Monitor-FEEM published its 
first annual report (the “2008 SWF Annual Report”) summarizing the 
activities of this subset of SWFs during 2008.165  Selected data from the 
2008 SWF Annual Report reveal that from January, 2007 to July, 2008, 
eight of the leading SWFs invested $63.1 billion in six of the world’s largest 
  
 159. Kern, supra note 45, at 30. 
 160. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ASSET 
ALLOCATION 2009 SPECIAL REPORT 17–18 (2009). 
 161. We do need to keep in mind that there is little available data on the actual 
performance of sovereign wealth funds, including data on total portfolio allocation among 
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 162. Bader Al Sa’ad, managing director of the Kuwait Investment Authority, noted his 
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Foe, 1 MILTON ASSET MGMT 1, 1–2 (2008). 
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 165. Veljko Fotak, Hui Li, & Bill Megginson, Sovereign Wealth Fund Losses in 
Listed Firm Stock Investments, in WEATHERING THE STORM: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2008 53 (Bernardo Bortolotti & William Miracky eds., 
Monitor Group & Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2009).  
100 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:1 
 
financial institutions166 in twelve separate transactions.167  By March, 2009, 
this aggregate $63.1 billion investment had been reduced by the collapse of 
global equity markets to $17.6 billion.168  Few categories of legitimate 
investments have lost 70% in value in so short a time. 
Deutsche Bank Research provides a different source of SWF 
performance data with comparable findings. It has been tracking SWFs and 
providing performance updates for several years.169  Table 2 is based upon 
this Deutsche Bank data.  Of the SWF investments in financial institutions 
included in Table 2, the two worst performers for the extremely short period 
of the current economic crisis are Merrill Lynch, where investors could 
have incurred a maximum potential loss of 85%, and Citigroup, where the 
maximum possible loss was 96%. 
Other staggering losses suffered by SWFs include CIC’s ten percent 
stake in The Blackstone Group L.P., purchased with a much publicized $3 
billion investment in April 2007.  This investment was valued at less than 
$1 billion in mid-2009.170  A Dubai SWF invested $5.5 billion in MGM 
Mirage, a casino and hotel operator, with stock purchases made at prices 
ranging from $82 to $95.171  The stock then fell to $12.172  Temasek, the 
transparent Singapore SWF, publicly reported a loss of $27.7 billion for its 
fiscal year ending in March 2009.173   In September 2009, a second 
Singapore SWF, The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 
(“GIC”),174 announced that its portfolio of more than $100 billion in 
international investments had lost more than 20% of its value through 
March 2009.175  Deutsche Bank estimates that overall equity investment 
portfolios of SWFs (i.e., not just investments in financial institutions 
  
 166. UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche 
Bank.  
 167. Fotak, Li, & Megginson, supra note 164.  Indeed all but one of these investments 
were made in the 12 months preceding the shocking collapse of the New York based 
investment bank, Bear Stearns, in mid-March 2008.  The collapse of Bear marked the 
awakening of the world to the enormity of the economic crisis of the first decade of the 21st 
Century.  The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. on September 15, 2008 
confirmed this for any remaining skeptics. 
 168. Id. at 57. 
 169. See, e.g., Kern, supra note 45. 
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included in Table 2) may have fallen as much as 45% between January 2007 
and mid-2009.176 
Despite these unprecedented losses, SWFs did not succumb to panic and 
sell off their losing investments.  The absence of panic selling,, or indeed, 
any significant sell off at all, is consistent with the conclusion that SWFs are 
managed by sophisticated investment managers with a long-term 
perspective.  Thus, even without knowing the investment philosophy or 
long term strategy for many of the SWFs, the available data suggests that 
SWFs have acted like private funds managed for wealth maximization. 
A.   SWF Investment Adjustments Arising from the Crisis 
Redeploying assets is the right of any investor, whether responsible to 
one or more private investors or to a sovereign nation.  In an economic 
slowdown or crisis, however, funds that are set aside for future generations 
and thus deliberately removed from the immediate spending plans of the 
legislature or executive, are attractive to politicians dealing with projected 
budget deficits.  Resisting the temptation to tap SWFs by redirecting 
investment to projects in the SWFs home jurisdiction or to current expenses 
can be particularly difficult, even if economically optimal.177   
In the present crisis there has been domestic criticism in some 
jurisdictions that have SWFs.178  Evidence exists of some refocusing of 
investment behavior by some SWFs triggered, at least in part, by domestic 
political pressures.  A few examples that demonstrate the shift in investment 
behavior are listed below: 
 
• Russia announced that it has removed $43.7 billion from one of its two 
SWFs to cover a shortfall in its 2009 budget.179 
• Brazilian officials have discussed taking a portion of its SWF, established 
only at the end of 2008, to cover a possible upcoming election year budget 
shortfall in 2010.180 
• The Kuwait Investment Authority formally announced that its massive 
SWF will refrain from further international investments and focus on 
domestic investing.181 
  
 176. See Kern, supra note 45. 
 177. It might be noted in passing that the U.S. has seldom been able to resist the 
political pressures to spend and incur additional debt. 
 178. Just two examples are Norway and China. 
 179. Toni Vorobyova, Russia Oil Fund to Cover Budget Shortfalls, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLNE51203F20090203. 
 180. Andre Soliani, Brazil May Tap Wealth Fund Next Year, Bernardo Says 
(Update2), BLOOMBERG, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20670001&sid=aHzF5HN4b4dA (“‘Brazil may tap its 15.8 billion real ($8.6 billion) 
sovereign wealth fund next year to help finance spending without widening the budget 
deficit,’ Planning and Budget Minister Paulo Bernardo said.”). 
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• Other SWFs have made international investments that involve immediate 
domestic benefits as well.  For example, an Abu Dhabi investment with 
General Electric includes arrangements for GE renewable energy 
technology to be transferred to Masdar Energy City, a project of Abu 
Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company. 182  Also, a $2.7 billion 
Daimler transaction, completed in March, 2009, gave Aabar Investments a 
9.1% stake in Daimler and involves a joint venture for electric automobiles 
and a training center in Abu Dhabi for its engineers. 183 
• Temasek, with a long and impressive track record of successful investing, 
is considering packaging and selling portions of its investment portfolio to 
the public. 184   
• Temasek is also considering managing investment funds for others.  With 
its stellar investment record such a move should be successful and would 
blur “the line[] between public and private [debt].  This may be the future 
of sovereign wealth funds.”185 
• Norway has also taken advantage the opportunities accompanying the 
worldwide collapse of equity markets.  It has announced a rebalancing of 
its entire portfolio.  It now plans to have 60% of its portfolio in equities, an 
increase from the previous, more conservative allocation of 40%.186 
 
As further evidence that SWFs act like rational private investors, SWFs 
have been described in the press as “vulture” investors, the latter a term 
normally associated with aggressive hedge funds and others who have the 
cash to seize upon an opportunity to acquire “distressed” assets.187   
One impact of the crisis has been increased focus at home on the foreign 
investment activities of various SWFs.  The transparent, super-large 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund — Global,188 has encountered 
significant domestic political pressures.  In the September 2009 Norwegian 
election, each political party campaigned in part on the proper allocation of 
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resources in the national SWF.   Norway’s SWF acknowledges that 
domestic political considerations have had a direct impact on its investment 
decisions.  Despite the objections of the SWF’s CEO, Norway has more 
than twenty-five companies on a blacklist for various, non-financial reasons.  
As one example, the Norwegian SWF’s holdings of Wal-Mart were sold 
because of that company’s resistance to labor union organizing efforts and 
other violations of workers’ human rights.   Elbit, an Israeli company, has 
been blacklisted by Norway because it produces surveillance systems used 
on the wall separating the West Bank from Israel.189  
B.   The Crisis and the Chinese Reaction 
In analyzing the unique risks posed by SWFs, China is a special case.  
The dramatic growth of China’s soft power and influence is the hallmark of 
the first decade of the 21st century.190  Since 2004, the  media has offered 
sound bites to the public that have routinely referred  to the challenge 
China’s currently uniquely successful form of state capitalism191 poses to 
free market forms of capitalism.  China’s stunning success requires that we 
take a brief look at its role in the global economy. 192 
China’s $297 billion SWF, CIC, created only at the end of 2007, has 
been hyper-active during the crisis.  China also has hundreds of billions of 
additional foreign exchange assets in its State Agency for Foreign Exchange 
(“SAFE”), which some believe also acts as a SWF,  making  
unacknowledged  international investments.  China has also deployed its $2 
trillion in foreign exchange reserves as loans from the state to support 
activities of Chinese SOEs in pursuit of goals that coincide with the 
diplomatic and economic goals of China itself. 
The pace of foreign investment by Chinese SOEs and CIC has 
accelerated during the crisis.  Foreign direct investment by Chinese 
companies totaled less than $50 billion in the five years ending in 2007.  For 
2008 and 2009, according to the Chinese Commerce Ministry, Chinese 
companies are on track to invest over $100 billion.193   Fortuitous timing and 
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trillions in investable cash has led China, through its SWF and its SOEs, to 
act just like a wealth-maximizing private investor. 
C.   The Ice Cream Problem 
While China’s acknowledged SWF, CIC, is not the largest such fund, 
China itself holds more than $2 trillion in foreign currency holdings,194 and 
more dollar reserves than any other nation.  Given the fall of the dollar 
against the Euro and the yen and the inflationary potential of the trillions of 
dollars of new commitments the U.S. Government has made to ameliorate 
the impact of the economic crisis, China can be viewed as a prisoner of its 
vast dollar holdings.  Were it to attempt to sell its U.S. Treasury and related 
debt instruments, it is widely understood that the value of its dollar 
denominated holdings would immediately collapse.195  China fully 
recognizes this problem.  It refers to the $1.2 trillion in dollar instruments as 
“melting ice cream.”196  China’s solution to this challenge is to spend its 
dollar assets to purchase or gain access to hard assets, including 
manufacturing facilities and commodities.  
CIC reported in 2008 that it had invested less than 15% of its available 
assets, including 9% in bonds and fixed income securities and only 3.2% in 
equities, leaving 87%, or $260 billion, in cash and cash equivalents 
available to take advantage of the global drop in commodities and other 
prices.197  Although China’s $1.2 trillion in dollar assets may be “melting,” 
CIC, and China’s SOEs are in an ideal position to spend China’s dollar 
assets to acquire manufacturing assets, commodities, or interests in 
enterprises which control commodities, and to do so at favorable prices, 
which reflect the collapse of the global economy. 
Chinese companies have purchased Hummer, one of General Motors’ 
automobile brands, and have sought to purchase both Opel, the German-
based GM car manufacturer, and Volvo, a Ford Motors brand.  The Chinese 
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offered to participate in the proposed purchase of SAAB, yet another GM 
brand being divested.   Chinese SOEs have been extremely active in 2009.  
PetroChina signed a $33 billion agreement with Exxon to purchase liquefied 
natural gas from a new Australian offshore field.198  Other Chinese entities 
have purchased, or attempted to invest in Rio Tinto, a British-Australian 
mining giant, and Addax Petroleum, a Swiss-based company, with interests 
in oil fields in Nigeria, Canada, and elsewhere.  In resource-rich Australia, 
the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board reviewed 90 separate 
Chinese investment proposals in just eighteen months.199 
During September, 2009, CIC announced a number of transactions 
indicative of its current approach — spending dollars to acquire real assets 
before the ice cream melts. CIC agreed to purchase $1.9 billion in the debt 
of Indonesia’s largest coal company, PT Bumi Resources and invested $850 
million to purchase a 15% stake in Noble Group Ltd., based in Hong Kong, 
which owns and trades commodities.200  During the same week CIC 
reported committing $1 billion to Los Angeles-based Oaktree Capital 
Management.201  The following week it became public knowledge that (i) 
CNOOC was seeking to purchase access to six billion barrels of oil in 
Nigeria,202 (ii) Sinochem, a Chinese chemicals trading company, had offered 
to purchase an Australian agricultural chemicals maker, and (iii) China had 
invested $939 million to add to its interests in gas and oil producers in 
Kazakhstan.203 
China’s SWF has not been involved in all these transactions, but if there 
is a threat from Chinese ownership of assets, there is no reason to 
distinguish the risks presented by CIC, a SWF, and the Chinese SOEs, such 
as CNOOC, Sinochem, or PetroChina.  Each of these SOEs could be subject 
to demands from China to conduct politically motivated investing.204 
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It should also be quite clear, however, that each of these investments is 
consistent with the investment approach of a private investor, seeking long 
term investments in currently depressed assets of various types.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
A.   General Observations 
SWFs have the staying power to be long term investors.  They are not 
under pressure from investors to generate quarterly short term gains.  Long-
term growth is often a SWF’s stated goal.  Knowing their true, as opposed 
to stated, investment philosophies or strategies does not mean that an 
investee nation or its politically sensitive elected officials will know what an 
investing SWF might do in the future.  This applies as well to privately held 
hedge funds and other types of investors.   Markets in the United States and 
elsewhere have been regulated based upon the premise that investors are 
economically rational, acting in their own best interests.  For rational 
investors qua investors, this means that these investors seek wealth 
maximization.  Some fear the theoretical possibility that when a SWF acts 
in its own best interest, that interest may not be wealth maximization, but 
the political, diplomatic, or economic interests of its sovereign owner. 
B.   SWF’s Unique Characteristic: Domestic Political Pressures 
The available evidence establishes that SWFs have thus far invested to 
maximize their wealth, just like large investment funds that are not 
controlled by sovereign nations.  If CIC and other SWFs act like any other 
institutional investor or hedge fund, why the fear-mongering in the press?205  
Can the problem be lack of transparency?  Hedge funds and other large 
investors operate with their investing activities somewhat hidden from 
public knowledge.   Some SWFs as well may not disclose much of what 
they hold or what they do as investors.  But with a constant influx of 
investable funds and freedom from the demands of impatient investors for 
instant gratification, SWFs can and do invest for the long term.  So where is 
the threat?    If SWFs invest for the long term, their interests are aligned 
with the interests of the entities in which they have invested.   Was there a 
need for CFIUS or FINSA or comparable legislation elsewhere? 
The most important distinguishing feature of a SWF is not that it 
unwaveringly seeks its own political ends.   Indeed, Senator Charles 
Schumer, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, has 
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acknowledged that “[i]t would be perfectly rational to expect a government-
controlled fund to have non-economic motivations.”206  Rather, the unique 
characteristic of a SWF or SOE investment is the possibility that the 
sovereign will use its SWF or SOE investments for other than wealth-
maximizing purposes.  A sovereign could use its SWF to take politically 
motivated actions.  There is no evidence that this has occurred.  There is a 
long history of SWF investing with no political or non-economic purposes.  
Nevertheless, regardless of whether one believes the Chinese Communist 
Party, which ultimately controls China’s $2 trillion in foreign exchange, is a 
long-term economic investor or is intent upon undermining the United 
States and displacing U.S. hegemony, the possibility exists that diplomatic 
and political interests or home country economics could drive a  sovereign 
to make an investment decision that is in the best interest of the sovereign 
but not the investee company.207  SWFs and SOEs are “complex political 
and economic institutions”208 subject to forces other than wealth-
maximizing goals. 
We have evidence that domestic demands have been accommodated by 
management of a few SWFs during the current economic crisis.209  But the 
resulting changes in SWF behavior are consistent with carefully considered 
investing decisions by well informed asset managers.    Notwithstanding the 
long history of legitimate SWF investing and the benign results of the 
revealing stress test of SWF behavior during the most severe economic 
crisis in seventy-five years, the risk that a sovereign might direct a SWF to 
make a decision not based upon the interests of the investee company, but 
upon an inconsistent interest of that sovereign, cannot be eliminated.  
Moreover, SWF transparency and democracy may have the perverse impact 
of contributing to the political pressures on SWFs to take action in aid of the 
local economy.210 
It is precisely the transparency that the OECD and major investee nations 
seek, and that the IWG’s Santiago Principles promote, that gives some 
domestic constituencies of SWFs the information necessary to pressure a 
national SWF to change its investment philosophy or to abandon long-term 
investment international investing goals for immediate domestic needs. 
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Investments by SWFs in the United States are subject to CFIUS.  CFIUS 
has a quite loose definition of control.  Thus, CFIUS can work to deal with 
the theoretical threat some perceive by assiduously reviewing SWF, SOE 
and other foreign investments in U.S. companies.   We shall see over the 
years, as SWFs grow in relative importance, just how well CFIUS works. 
C.   The Bottom Line 
This review began with a hypothetical scenario based upon worst case 
theories about SWFs and their influence upon the U.S. economy.  SWFs are 
pools of fantastic wealth, which will only grow in significance as the global 
economy adjusts to higher energy prices, further economic development in 
Asia and Latin America, and less irresponsible borrowing by American 
consumers. 
We have considered recent SWF investments in the world’s leading 
financial institutions and the losses almost immediately suffered by them as 
the subprime crisis developed into a global economic slowdown.  We have 
looked briefly at CFIUS and FINSA, the Congressional response to the 
SWF threat.  We have seen that investment activities of SWFs have been 
influenced by the financial crisis.  We know of the 24 Santiago Principles of 
the IWG’s GAPP that are intended to head off criticism of SWFs.  We have 
noted the perverse impact of transparency on the capacity of SWFs to 
behave like private investors, driven by wealth maximization. 
SWFs will grow in importance as key factors in the global economy.  So 
long as CFIUS is assiduously applied, it will serve the American public 
interest by permitting the United States to remain open to foreign 
investment while arming the federal government with instruments adequate 
to deal with transactions that could pose a danger to national security. 
 
2009] Attack of the Sovereign Wealth Funds 109 
 
APPENDIX A: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INSTITUTE ROSTER OF SWFS 
Country Fund Name Assets Inception Origin 
SWF to 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserve 
Ratio 
Linaburg-
Maduell 
Transparency 
Index 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority 
$627 1976 Oil 29.5 3 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $431 n/a Oil 12.7 2 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global $396.60 1990 Oil 7.1 10 
China SAFE Investment Company $347.1  
Non-
Commodity 0.2 2 
China China Investment Corporation $288.80 2007 
Non-
Commodity 0.1 6 
Singapore 
Government of 
Singapore 
Investment 
Corporation 
$247.50 1981 Non-Commodity 1.9 6 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $202.80 1953 Oil 12.7 6 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio 
$193.40 1998 Non-Commodity 1 8 
Russia National Welfare Fund $178.5 2008 Oil 0.4 5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $122 1974 Non-Commodity 0.8 10 
China National Social Security Fund $82.40 2000 
Non-
commodity nil 5 
UAE - Dubai 
Investment 
Corporation of 
Dubai 
$82 2006 Oil 2.8 4 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority $65 2006 Oil 0.8 2 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $65 2003 Oil 8.6 5 
Australia Australian Future Fund $49.30 2004 
Non-
Commodity 1.8 9 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund  $47 2000 Oil 0.3 1 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund $38 2000 Oil 1.1 6 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency $30 1983 Oil  1 
France Strategic Investment Fund $28 2008 
Non-
Commodity 0.2 new 
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South Korea Korea Investment Corporation $27 2005 
Non-
Commodity 0.1 9 
US - Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund $26.70 1976 Oil 0.5 10 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional $23.10 1993 Non-Commodity 0.3 4 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund $22.80 2001 
Non-
Commodity 36.6 10 
Chile 
Social and 
Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
$21.80 1985 Copper 0.9 9 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
Mubadala 
Development 
Company 
$14.70 2002 Oil 0.3 10 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company $14 2006 Oil 2.9 7 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
International 
Petroleum 
Investment 
Company 
$14 1984 Oil n/a n/a 
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund $13 1999 Oil 0.2 1 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund $11.90 1999 Oil 0.6 9 
US - New 
Mexico 
New Mexico State 
Investment Office 
Trust 
$11.70 1958 Non-Commodity 0.2 9 
Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund $11.10 1976 Oil 0.4 9 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account $9.40 2004 Oil 0.2 1 
New Zealand 
New Zealand 
Superannuation 
Fund 
$8.60 2003 Non-Commodity 0.8 10 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil $8.60 2009 
Non-
commodity nil new 
Oman State General Reserve Fund $8.20 1980 Oil & Gas 0.3 1 
Botswana Pula Fund $6.90 1996 Diamonds & Minerals 0.7 1 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund $5.30 2008 Oil nil 3 
China China-Africa Development Fund $5.00 2007 
Non-
Commodity nil 4 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund $4.20 2005 Oil & Gas n/a 6 
US - 
Wyoming 
Permanent 
Wyoming Mineral 
Trust Fund 
$3.60 1974 Minerals nil 9 
US - 
Alabama Alabama Trust Fund $3.10 1986 Gas nil 6 
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Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Heritage and 
Stabilization Fund $2.90 2000 Oil n/a 5 
Malaysia 
Terengganu 
Investment 
Authority 
$2.80 2008 Oil New 
 
UAE - Ras 
Al Khaimah 
RAK Investment 
Authority $1.20 2005 Oil X 3 
Venezuela FIEM $0.80 1998 Oil nil 1 
Vietnam 
State Capital 
Investment 
Corporation 
$0.50 2006 Non-Commodity 0.1 4 
Kiribati 
Revenue 
Equalization 
Reserve Fund 
$0.40 1956 Phosphates n/a 1 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit $0.30 2006 
Non-
commodity X X 
Mauritania 
National Fund for 
Hydrocarbon 
Reserves 
$0.30 2006 Oil & Gas X 1 
UAE - 
Federal 
Emirates Investment 
Authority X 2007 Oil X 2 
Oman Oman Investment Fund X 2006 Oil X n/a 
UAE - Dubai Dubai World X 2006 Oil X n/a 
  
 
Total Oil & Gas 
Related $2,259.50     
 
Total Other $1,545.80
 
 
TOTAL $3,805.30
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APPENDIX B:  IWG GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
(GAPP) – SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES 
In furtherance of the “Objective and Purpose,” the IWG members either 
have implemented or intend to implement the following principles and 
practices, on a voluntary basis, each of which is subject to home country 
laws, regulations, requirements and obligations. This paragraph is an 
integral part of the GAPP. 
 
GAPP 1. Principle 
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective 
operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).  
GAPP 1.1. Subprinciple. The legal framework for the SWF should ensure 
legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.  
GAPP 1.2. Subprinciple. The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and 
structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and other state 
bodies, should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 2. Principle 
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly 
disclosed. 
 
GAPP 3. Principle 
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic 
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely coordinated 
with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure 
consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies. 
 
GAPP 4. Principle 
There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or 
arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, 
withdrawal, and spending operations. 
GAPP 4.1. Subprinciple. The source of SWF funding should be publicly 
disclosed.  
GAPP 4.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to withdrawals from the 
SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly 
disclosed. 
 
GAPP 5. Principle 
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on a 
timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where 
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets. 
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GAPP 6. Principle 
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a 
clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to facilitate 
accountability and operational independence in the management of the SWF 
to pursue its objectives. 
 
GAPP 7. Principle 
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of its 
governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures, and 
exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations. 
 
GAPP 8. Principle 
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and 
have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out its 
functions. 
 
GAPP 9. Principle 
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s 
strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined 
responsibilities. 
 
GAPP 10. Principle 
The accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should be clearly 
defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents, or 
management agreement. 
 
GAPP 11. Principle 
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF’s 
operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in 
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards 
in a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 12. Principle 
The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually 
in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards in 
a consistent manner. 
 
GAPP 13. Principle 
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made 
known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, and 
staff. 
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GAPP 14. Principle 
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s operational 
management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and 
follow clear rules and procedures. 
 
GAPP 15. Principle 
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in 
compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the 
countries in which they operate. 
 
GAPP 16. Principle 
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which 
the SWF’s management is operationally independent from the owner, 
should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 17. Principle 
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly 
disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to 
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust in 
recipient countries. 
 
GAPP 18. Principle 
The SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent with its 
defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the 
owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio 
management principles. 
GAPP 18.1. Subprinciple. The investment policy should guide the SWF’s 
financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage. 
GAPP 18.2. Subprinciple. The investment policy should address the extent 
to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range of 
their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected and 
their performance monitored. 
GAPP 18.3. Subprinciple. A description of the investment policy of the 
SWF should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 19. Principle 
The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted 
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and 
based on economic and financial grounds. 
GAPP 19.1. Subprinciple. If investment decisions are subject to other than 
economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the 
investment policy and be publicly disclosed. 
GAPP 19.2. Subprinciple. The management of an SWF’s assets should be 
consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management 
principles. 
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GAPP 20. Principle 
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or 
inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with 
private entities. 
9 
GAPP 21. Principle 
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their 
equity investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership 
rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment 
policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF should 
publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, 
including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 
 
GAPP 22. Principle 
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages 
the risks of its operations. 
GAPP 22.1. Subprinciple. The risk management framework should include 
reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable the 
adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within acceptable 
parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes of conduct, 
business continuity planning, and an independent audit function. 
GAPP 22.2. Subprinciple. The general approach to the SWF’s risk 
management framework should be publicly disclosed. 
 
GAPP 23. Principle 
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to 
benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the 
owner according to clearly defined principles or standards. 
 
GAPP 24. Principle 
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should be 
engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.  
 
  
 
 
